Now she claims that such non-hypothetical usage can also be found in nonmoral contexts. Though this may be true. I do noc think that Mrs. Foot has shown the nonmoral contexts in which she thinks it also operates. In fact, I doubt whether one can correctly maintain and adequately support the non-hypothetical use of 'should' in the context of club rules or rules of etiquette.2 Let us consider Mrs. Foot's full description of the non-hy pothetical use of shouldm . She allows that for the non·hypothetical use or sbou ld m , "where a moral ground is suggested as the reason why something should be done, we may say chat a man should 11> without the implication that ., -ing stands in an ancillary relation to his desires or interests." It may, or course, but it is not necessary. We may, for example, suppose thal others care about the moral ends she mentions. But even 1 / others do 1101 care about such ends, the shouldm is correctly maintained and "adequately supported if the right kind of thing can be shown about the nature of the action."
Tf I read Mrs. Foot correctly, the full description of the 'adequately supported and correctly maintained' non-hypothetical use of shouldm is as follows: "What is not necessary is that we should show a connexion with the agent's (or anyone else's) desires or intere.. c;ts if we are to correctly maintain our use of shouldm ."
What I wish to show is that either the non-hypothetical use of shoulde 3 is not analogous to the shouldm . or that the shoulde is, to use Beck's language. a conditionnl categorical 'should' or an elliptical expression of a hypothetical 'should'.' Clearly Mrs. Foot is correct in saying that sbould e does not fail to apply to one e'en if he sensibly decides to ignore it. If we are correctly to maintain our use of shoulde. it must also stand supported even when there exists no connection with the agent's desires or interests. But whether or not the agent sensibly decides to ignore the shoulde. it's non-hypothetical use is not analogous to that of should m .
For them to be analogous, for the argument to do what Foot sets it up to do, the non-hy pothetical should e must also stand supported even when there exists no connection with the agent's, or anyone's, desire or interest -as long as the right kind of thing can be shown about the nature of the action. Let us consider Foot's dilemma. I agree that we do not "create reasons for acting simply by putting together any silly rules and introducing a non-hypothetical 'should'." I also agree thait the ''non-hypothetical 'should' does not nec e ssarily imply reasons for acting." This does not, of course, aipply to all non-hypothetical uses of should m. For Lhe first use of the non-hypothetical should m may be 'adequately supported· where a moral ground is supplied as the reason for acting and the right kind of thing can be shown about the nature of the action. The same thing cannot be said about the non-hypothetical use of shoulde .
Now it
Perhaps here we should introduce another 'no n-hypothetical' use of 'should', the gratuitous use ()f 'should'. The should g . in any context, by definition, gives no reasons for acting. Here we must agree with Foot. if the shouldm is used as the should 9 . there are no reasons to give , nothing to be proved.
Let us turn to the firstl sense 1n which a moral system might be said to consist entirely of hypothetical imperatives. In this sense the hypothetical should m applies "only in case the right connexion could be found with the agent's interests or desires." The hypothetical shouldm operates only for members of the group which share common aims, so that if others outside the group do not care about the ends of morality they have no moral reason to refrain from stealing, rape, murder, and the like. Yet Foot maintains that we could change to a hypothetical use of should m "without destroying or even disrupting morality". And "that it would not matter at ull if we made this change in our usage" -unless of course we have "pure in tuitions" about morality. Since we don't, our only loss. Foot claims, is ''one among our many instruments for expressing a hostile attitude to persons outside the moral group". In this hypothetical use of shouldm . we could no longer say that others outside the group shouldn't act as they do. Similarly. the indifferent amoral man has no moral reason to regard the rights of others, nor does he have reason to disregard them. Foot is corre ct; this man ha.� no rea.�on to behave moralJy. But it also follows that he has no reason to behave im· mo rally: neither 'Hurt others' nor 'Help others' will provide a reason for his acting.
What a c;irange case. We are unable to provide any reason for acting, moral or immoral. hypothetical or non-hypothetical. H we cannot find the right connection with this man · s interests or desires. we cannot mothate him or provide him with reasons for acting: if he is apathetic. if it is a matter of indifference whether he offends or not, again we cannot provide him with reasons for acting. He should hardly be our test case, or a monitor for detenninang whether certain uses of 'should' may or may not provide re3sons for acting.
In the second sense of our hypothetical should m . the agent has :reason for acting when and only when moral considerations are related Lo his desires or interests.
Foot thinks that it may seem extraordinary that such a man may have a 'good will,' possess every 'irtue and have moral principles. In fact, it is not at all extraordinary; it is a very compelling conception of a moral man. It is so disarming, that even Kant might pause. and concede wilh Foot that such a man may be all that she claims he is. In fact, it may make us all non-categorical moralists.
Jn this syst em. practical reasoning, consisting only of hypothetical shouldm , the agent is a man of resolution and self-disciplinc. s Such a man may want. "and want more than anything in the world, lo help other people; and his hypothetical im· pcrati,es wall then relate to such ends." This man could have alJ the virtues; where they are not defined by their relation to an end. this agent, having engaged in his de�ire · dependent practical reasoning. mi ght belie' e that "rules of honesty and justice were important for the common good and the protection of the weak, about "htch he cared." lo addition, he wanted "to live openly and in good faith with his r.eighbors and lhcrefore refused dishonesty and injustice even where it seemed po�ible to conceal these things and nuJlify their bad effec ts."
If we substitute throughout for may want' and 'might belie ve' such expressions as ' wanted' , 'does m fa ct have' or 'helievt>'; and odd, as Foot does, that thL 'I agent's desire-dependent practical reason ing is "in conformity with virtue not contingently but as directed to the ends internal to the virtue concerned", why indeed would we deny virtue to such a man? And further, thi s agent does not want another's happiness merely for the sake of his own. nor does he want to be honest
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because it is lhe best policy; rather be simply wants another person's happine�. and he wants to be honest because of the importance of honesty in the life or the community, and on account of his concern for the common good.
Indeed Kant himself must rejoice, for his theory of human nature rests on a false pre mise; and for the army of volunteers, which Foot describes so well, we have discovered "just that set of ends which would give true virtue rather than accidental conformity."
Having abandoned Kant's theory of human action, we are now presented with a "set of ends which would give true virtue rather than accidental conformity." Why, indeed. should we deny virtue to one whose desires are in conformity with virtue not co11ti11gently but as directed to the ends i11ternal to the virtue concerned. as is so well put by FoOL? Here, though they may provide 'incentive' it is not desires and interests which constitute the determining ground of an action. It is the ends in ternal to the virtue concerned when related to the agent's interests and desires. To put it different!;,:. it is the ends considered inllernal to virtue that make these ends morally desirable not the desiring of these ends that make them morally desirable.
If so. then these ends may be considered, and sometimes are considered as desirable independent of the agent's des ires or interests. The interests and desires of this agent appear co be purely moral; his actions are self-imposed and endorsed by hi� own desire-dependent practical reason ing: we might even say that his concern and care exhibit reverence and respect for the ends of moraliry. Though the question whether his maxims are capable of becoming laws does not arise, he subjects himself to no other 'will' but his own. Though. I suspect, if we push this too Car we would have a non-hypothetical use of 'should'.
Even from Foot's view, ethics does not appear as merely an elaboration of human psy chology. One's desires and interests are non-contingently directed and in timately bound up with the requirements of the ends of morality itself; e.g. such a moral agent desires perhaps more than anything else, to do what is right as such.
Even here it would not be correct to say that interests and desires do not meet the conditions of inescapability which attach to the criteria of morality. For it is not the desire or interest which provides the moral support, though these would be, on Foot's view, necessary conditions of the motivational source of practical action.
Kant himself admits that love, for example, as an affection ('pathological love') cannot be a command of duty. In one place, h,e says that "Consequently, the law ... does not command the action itself ... "6 There is then some question whether, according to Kant, we have a duty to adopt our reverent respect for the moral law as our sufficient incentive for obeying the universali1,ability·requirement of the law.
So we can have no dury to adopt the ends of morality, since we can never _k now if our interest is exclusively based on reverent respect for the moral law; as such, we cannot, of course, be obligated to make certain that we motivate ourselves by such an interest. The 'disposition' of Foot's agent to e is already moral. His vi rtuousness has already developed to a high degree. Foot's agent is not so much striving for 'purity of heart' but is one, considering his concerns, whose character already constitutes 'purity of heart.'
A person may even believe that these moral ends are desirable, and yet not have any interest or desire to do what is right. So though aU pas.sional or motivational considerations involve desires and interests, the ends themselves are open to rational assessment: the reasons for acting in these contexts, though desire-dependent, are specifically moral. Now is it because these reasons constitute moral requirements that they motivate us to act, and if so, lo raise a broader question, then is it true that morality would not be disrupted if it consisted only of hypot hetical 'shoulds' in lhe first sense, so that these moral ends when independent of our desires or interests cannot mocivate us to act? Would we have lost only one of our de' ices for expressing hostility?
The major disagreement here is that Foot. contra Kant, denies that moral ends are ends that the agent has a duty to adopt. Though I, in part, agree with Foot, it is difficult to see what is paradoxical about this view as she prese nts it. Foot's position is the one that appears paradoxical. I may do my duty, independent of desire or interest, simply because it is my duty -as a teacher, doctor or policeman; but I do not have a duty, qua duty, to become a teacher, doctor or police man. I may have, as Foot would allow, duties within morality, but I cannot have a duty to adopt the ends of morality, or the ends which substantively define morality. It may not be good Kantian exegesis. but one may say that the "spirit of Kant" is preserved if we consider his fundamental theme within the context of "a community, every member of which is respected by all others, and in which only those rules of conduct are followed which everyone recognizes to be reasonable." 7 As a member of that community, my actions do not exhibit blind obedience to the commands of duty. Moreover, here, though we may have no argument for non-members, we have very powerful arguments for those who might waver, or for those who seek justification for their participation. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot justify not paying our taxes and ar the same time claim that we have a right to participate and share in what tax money provides. So whatever my desires or interests, I cannot justify not adopting the ends of morality of the above community and claim that I also have a right to participate and share in whatever benefits morality may afford_ Let us look at the free floating, unsubscripted 'ought' in 'One ought to be moral'.
Surely Foot is right; it is not clear just what is being said here. It seems to make no sense unless the 'ought' has 1he moral subscript. giving a tautology, or relates morality to non-moral systems. This is not an argument against any system, moral or non-moral, in which such an 'ought' operates. This 'ought' would be like the 'should9 ', the gratuitous 'should'. Here too, when the ought9 is issued, the un caring, amoral man, or any man for that matter, has no reason for acting morally; Foot's case is odd. When the 'ought' is subscripted, it still cannot provide reasons for acting for the uncaring, amoral man. U such a man is indifferent to the suffering of others, then he has no moral reason to act in order to relieve their suffering. But such a man is amoral. not immoral, and as such, though he has no moral ends which require regard for others, he has no ends which require disregard of others, i.e_ which require that he behave immorally. This is a paradoxical view: subscripted or unsubscripted. the 'ought', for such a man, would provide no reason for action in any context -moral, immoral. or non-moral. And if we take the 'One ought to be moral' to mean 'One ought to adopt the ends of morality, the ends which define morality', we cannot appeal to those ends within morality without begging the question or uttering a tautology. Similarly for club rules or rules of etiquette, either we beg the "question or issue: a tautology.
Let us now turn to the issue which may indeed make Kantians of us all. When it 157 6 Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 2 [1971] at least be shown that men, whatever their desires, may have the best reasons to act mor ally. This is not to say or to reduce moral considerations to considerati<;>ns of reason where "one has reason to do what iit is rational to do;" but that there are numerous reasons, moral and non-moral, why one ought to be moral . They will be complex and overlapping reasons; they will not serve to prove or demonstrate, but neither will they serve to merely express our feelings; hopefully they will exhibit or reveal a reasonable and well-founded case for being moral if certain other questions are first raised.
Let us indicate the additional inescapability of morality by contrasting and exhibiting the difference between the shouldm and the shoulde . Clearly questions in regard to the kind of person one wants to be, the kind of life one wants to live are more fundamental and significant than the social forms of decorum which may or may not be sensibly denied. It is largely arbitrary (and may be senseless or at least silly) whether or not one answer in the third person, invitations sent in the third person; or whether one uses a fork or spoon for eating peas; or to remain seated or standing when the !hostess approaches the table. These things may easily be changed; any rule or set of rules enabling us to get along in certain ways will do. If these rules are not connected to anyone's desires or interests, they seem to be simply senseless. If tlhey are so related, one may even sensibly ignore them; and though he may be unmannerly, may have morally redeeming reasons for acting in such a way, but the man who ignores the suffering and needs of others cannot be redeemed by appeal to the rules of etiquette (when these ar,e non-moral).
When there are disagreements about the shouldm and about the should e , the additional inescapability of morality is more apparent; moral consid erations are seen as more fundamental and significant. Consider two cases:
l. (a) The hostess thought that I was rude or at least unmannerly because I sat before she was seated; (b) I sat before the hostess was seated, but she did not think that I was rude or unmannerly, for she thought these social amenities were silly.
II. (a)
The hostess thought I was cruel, breaking the child's arm because in reac hing for the bread, he did not ask for permission; (b) I broke the child's arm, but the hostess did not think I was cruel, for she thought the rules of morality were silJy.
In the former case, the rules may or may not apply. They can be sensibly ignored.
In the former sort of case, it may be right to 9S , or it may be a matter of complete indifference if no one cares about these things. In the latter kind of case it is wrong to fO, and the man is a brute if IO-ing is done dispassion ately, wicked and depraved if S1-ing i s done with pleasure. ln support of Kann, though not for Kant's reasons, the thi ngs we say about the should m cannot be said about the shoulde ... in fact, in the second case we may certainly ask if the man is rational, i.e., does he know what he is doing, is he respo nsible for his actions? Perhaps he is rational, as he is surely inhumane. Some persons' feelings may be hurt if one violates 1he rnles or etiquette: one may expect 1ha1 price and remain a morally good man. To violate the rules of morali1y may render one unfit and cost one the right to live ia most forms of human society; he may have to contract out of human society.
Let us now relate the inescapability of morality with 'One ought to be moral', morally subscripted, addressed to men who are not wholly indifferent, though they may be amoral or pc:rhaps immoral. I am not trying lo invest human psychology with the requirements of logic. And it is no1 tautologous nor unreasonable 10 say answer the 'Why should we be moral?' question, he does not answer the 'Why should I be moral?' question.8 We could say, e.g. to be fully amoral is to be less than a man; to be fully immoral is to be both wicked and depraved . In either case. if our agents are not mindless, and if they do not refuse to listen, we may rationally motivate !hem to be moral by revealing in bold relief the agent's conception of It is not merely that a man is 'dishonest, ' 'unjust' and 'uncharitable,' it is dHficult to sec that such vices are tied up with the well·being of anyone. We want to be the best that we can become and although we must struggle alone here, we are alone as men. our ha1ard, as members or a human community. is that we may indeed contract out of such a community, become brutes, unfit, less than men. And perhaps moral inescapability enters and operates best when such men are wronged or belie\'e that they are wronged.
Consider the following:
"After l returned to pri son, I took a long look at myself and, for the first time in my life, admilled Lhat I was wrong, that I had gone astray -astray not so much I 59
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 2 [1971], No. 1, Art. 18 http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol2/iss1/18 Why can't a man contract out or morality? The inescapabillty of morality is not to be round only in appraisals of the moral character of others, as a device for expressing our hostility; but as a genuine concern with what the other is doing (not only to us) but to himself. I am not sure what it means to prove or look for the rrutb in such contexts; if we differ, the flag need not be dropped. for we require that our differences be well-founded and reasonable .
Perhaps there wi ll be less fear of being tricked if we start here: the question 'How can we make ourselves better?' should be one of the first questions reflective men should occempt lo answer. Here not only moral questions but much broader questions of character are raised. The question whether we have a duty to be moral requires broader treatment than appeal to any specific moral theory. Surely if the dimensions of human existence are reduced lo moral character alone as the most importalll and worthwhile, we suffer a loss. We want to become the best of all we arc capable of becoming. Morality is a part and an important part, but only a part, of these considerations; and why should we deny these concerns as fundamental themes of rational human nature. That though 1S a d1tferenl issue 3 ·e I shall use indlfferenlly. to mean either rules of etique11e or club rules where these are non moral . .: L w Beck, 'Apodlctic Imperatives', KANT-STUOIEN, X·XI (1957) 
